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PUTTING YOUR MONEY WHERE YOUR MOUTH IS: 
THE PERFORMANCE OF EARNOUTS IN CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS 
Brian JM Quinn 
This Article seeks to answer the question whether earnouts really serve 
to respond to adverse selection, as commonly believed, or if 
alternatively, they better address problems created by symmetric 
uncertainty.  To answer this question, I conduct difference of means 
tests for fair value estimates of earnouts at the time of acquisition and 
during the post-closing period.  To the extent sellers rely on earnouts 
during the pre-contractual period to signal unobservable information 
about their own quality to an acquirer, then post-closing fair value 
estimates should increase as acquirers confirm seller pre-signing 
statements.  In fact, I do not find significant differences in the fair value 
disclosures at the time of acquisition and during the post-closing period, 
which suggests that parties rely on earnouts primarily to resolve 
problems of uncertainty rather than adverse selection. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article seeks to answer the question of whether earnouts really 
serve to respond to adverse selection, as commonly believed, or if 
 
           Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  Many thanks to participants in the 
2011 C-LEAF Junior Scholars Workshop at The George Washington University Law School, the 2012 
Transactional Law Workshop (hosted by BYU Law), and the 2012 ASU Legal Scholars Conference.  
Thanks also to Afra Afsharipour, Bobby Bartlett, John Coates, Lawrence Cunningham, Steven 
Davidoff, Lisa Fairfax, Kent Greenfield, Michael Klausner, Renee Jones, Robert Rhee, and Gordon 
Smith for their comments at various stages of this Article. Elizabeth D. Johnston, Caitlin Mulligan, and 
Andrew Solow all provided important research assistance for this project.  Research for this Article was 
made possible with the support of the BC Law School Fund. 
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alternatively, whether earnouts better address problems created by 
uncertainty.  To answer this question, I conduct difference of means 
tests for fair value estimates of earnouts at the time of acquisition and 
during the post-closing period.  To the extent sellers rely on earnouts 
during the pre-contractual period to signal unobservable information 
about the sellers’ own quality to an acquirer, then post-closing fair value 
estimates should increase as acquirers confirm seller pre-signing 
statements.  In fact, I do not find significant differences in the fair value 
disclosures at the time of acquisition and during the post-closing period, 
which suggests that parties rely on earnouts primarily to resolve the 
problem of uncertainty rather than adverse selection. 
Previous studies have identified earnout provisions in merger 
agreements as possible contractual responses to the problem of adverse 
selection in the context of corporate acquisitions.1  According to this 
account, sellers have private information about themselves that they are 
unable to credibly convey to potential acquirers.  In the absence of a 
credible information signal, a high-quality seller may be unable to 
overcome the buyer’s presumption that there is hidden negative 
information about the seller.  A seller’s inability to verifiably 
demonstrate value may impede consummation of a potentially value-
enhancing transaction.  Financial economists suggest that high quality 
sellers rely on the earnout as a mechanism for sellers to signal private 
information about their quality to potential acquirers.2  By deferring the 
ultimate valuation of the target until a point in time after the buyer is 
able to confirm the seller’s pre-contractual statements, a high quality 
seller may be able to rely on an earnout mechanism to demonstrate her 
confidence in the firm’s value.3  Because an earnout provision is costly 
to sellers who know they are low quality sellers, those sellers should be 
 
 1. See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain, David J. Denis & Diane K. Denis, Earnouts: A Study of 
Financial Contracting in Acquisition Agreements, 51 J. ACCT. & ECON. 151 (2011); Ninon Kohers & 
James Ang, Earnouts in Mergers: Agreeing to Disagree and Agreeing to Stay, 73 J. BUS. 445 (2000); 
Srikant Datar, Richard Frankel & Mark Wolfson, Earnouts: The Effects of Diverse Selection and Agency 
Costs on Acquisition Techniques, 17 J. L.ECON. & ORG. 201 (2001); see also ROBERT F. BRUNER, 
APPLIED MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 614 (2004); Roberto Ragozzino & Jeffrey J. Reuer, Contingent 
Earnouts in Acquisitions of Privately Held Targets, 20 J. MGMT. 1 (2009).  Those of us in the legal 
academy who teach “Deals” classes often treat earnouts as contractual responses to asymmetric 
information. 
 2. See generally Cain et al., supra note 1; Datar et al.,  supra note 1; Kohers & Ang, supra note 
1; see also Raggazinno & Reuer, supra note 1.  All of these sources endorse the adverse 
selection/signaling hypothesis. 
 3. Victor P. Goldberg, Economic Reasoning and the Framing of Contract Law: Sale of an Asset 
of Uncertain Value 11 (Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 164, 2000), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=216649 (making the claim that earnouts are a 
contractual response to adverse selection); see also VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 143 (2006) [hereinafter Framing Contract] (making similar claim with respect 
to earnouts as contractual responses to adverse selection). 
2
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/3
2012] EARNOUTS IN CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 129 
expected to avoid agreeing to receive contingent payments.  Thus, the 
earnout provision may permit a high quality seller to “put her money 
where her mouth is” and thus credibly convey hidden information about 
her quality to prospective buyers.4  
A recent example illustrates the point that earnouts can help parties 
reach agreement on valuation issues.  In April 2011, Sanofi, S.A. 
acquired Genzyme Corp.5  During merger negotiations, the parties had a 
fundamental disagreement over Genyzme’s valuation.  Genzyme had 
previously experienced a number of difficulties in the production plants 
for its Cerezyme and Fabrazyme products.  Genzyme management 
believed they resolved these serious production issues.  These problems, 
however, had a materially negative impact on the valuation of the firm.6  
Genzyme’s management also believed that Lemtrada, a drug in the 
company’s development pipeline, had the potential to be extremely 
profitable for the firm.7  For its part, Sanofi was less sanguine about the 
prospects of these products to contribute to the firm’s bottom line or that 
Genzyme had overcome its production problems.  In order to bridge 
these differences, the parties structured the merger consideration in this 
transaction in the following manner: the first component consisted of a 
cash payment equal to $74 per share payable at closing.8  The second 
component was a contingent payment of up to $14 per share payable 
after the closing upon Genzyme’s achievement of certain regulatory and 
financial milestones.9  The contingent payment in this case helped 
 
 4. JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 206 (1975).  Cf. Datar et al., supra note 1, at 
208.  Simple assertions by the seller lack credibility in the context of negotiations and may be 
interpreted as “cheap talk” unless the seller is able to convey the information credibly.  In order to 
convey information credibly, the statement must come at some cost to the speaker. R. PRESTON 
MCAFEE, COMPETITIVE SOLUTIONS: THE STRATEGIST’S TOOLKIT 376–77 (2002). 
 5. Genzym Revenues Grow in First-Quarter 2011, GENZYME (Sept. 10, 2012, 7:10 PM), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/genzyme/20110427006998/en. 




 7. See Timeline: Sanofi’s Quest for U.S. Biotech Genzyme, REUTERS, Feb. 15, 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/15/genzyme-sanofi-timeline-idUSN1519571120110215. 
 8. Albertina Torsoli & Meg Tirrell, Sanofi–Genzyme Deal Worth $20.1 Billion, SFGATE, Feb. 
17, 2011, http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Sanofi-Genzyme-deal-worth-20-1-billion-
2474621.php. 
 9. Id.  The contingent payment took the form of a contingent value right (CVR), a registered 
security.  The CVR adopted in the Sanofi–Genzyme transaction is a form of earnout that is more 
common in the sale of public companies than in the sale of private companies. Genzyme, Questions and 
Answers Regarding the CVR (Form 8-K) (Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Genzyme Questions], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/732485/000095012311017162/b85162exv99waw43.htm.  
Sanofi contracted to make payments to security-holders contingent upon the following milestones: 
1.  $1/CVR if specified Cerezyme and Fabrazyme production thresholds are met for 2011; 
2.  $1/CVR upon final FDA approval of Lemtrada; 
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resolve the parties’ differences about production problems and revenue 
expectations for drugs in the Genzyme pipeline.  To the extent the 
production issues had been resolved—as Genzyme managers assured the 
acquirer they were—Genzyme shareholders would receive additional 
value.  To the extent the pipeline drugs lived up to the expectations of 
Genzyme’s management, that success would be reflected in an increase 
in the ex post valuation of the seller as demonstrated by an increase in 
the contingent payment obligation.  If Genzyme failed to perform to 
expectations, Sanofi would not be required to make additional 
payments.  By deferring the ultimate determination of value until a point 
in the future, both the buyer and the seller were able to proceed with the 
deal notwithstanding unresolved differences with respect to valuation.10 
There are two competing hypotheses to explain the motivation for 
parties’ reliance on earnouts in merger agreements.  Financial 
economists and legal scholars commonly believe that earnouts are a 
contractual response to adverse selection.  According to this theory, 
earnouts play an important role in eliciting hidden information from 
sellers.  By deferring the final valuation until a later point in time, sellers 
are able to signal their unobservable quality to potential buyers and thus 
resolve information asymmetries.  Therefore, when Genzyme’s 
managers agreed to defer some portion of the consideration, they may be 
signaling private information to Sanofi.  According to the competing 
hypothesis, earnouts do not play a role in conveying information 
between the parties.  Rather, earnouts respond to the problem of 
uncertainty present in merger transactions.  Earnouts resolve uncertainty 
by assigning the risk of a negative outcome to the seller and therefore 
facilitate the parties in reaching an agreement. 
To date, the academic literature on the question of earnout provisions 
has focused largely on the adverse selection hypothesis as the best 
explanation for the use of earnouts.11  In industries and transactional 
 
3.  $2/CVR if global net sales revenue total $400 million; 
4.  $3/CVR if global net sales revenue total $1.8 billion; 
5.  $4/CVR if global net sales revenue total $2.3 billion; and  
6.  $3/CVR if global net sales revenue total $2.8 billion. 
 10. Earnouts and contingent compensation like the one used in the Sanofi–Genzyme transaction 
are relatively common provisions in merger agreements.  The 2011 Private Target Deal Points Study 
reports that earnout provisions are present in 38% of agreements in their sample of private company 
sellers.  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 2011 PRIVATE TARGET MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS DEAL 
POINTS STUDY 20 (2012) [hereinafter ABA]; see also Ragozzino & Reuer, supra note 1 (noting 
similarly high levels of contingent payment mechanisms when the seller is a private company).  The 
2011 M&A Deal Terms Study by Shareholder Representative Services conducted a review of 196 
transactions with private company targets.  In that survey, 23% of the transactions included a post-
closing contingent payment mechanism.  SHAREHOLDER REPRESENTATIVE SERVICES, 2011 M&A DEAL 
TERMS STUDY 18 (2011). 
 11. See, e.g., Cain et al., supra note 1, at 13; Datar et al. supra note 1; Kohers & Ang, supra note 
4
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/3
2012] EARNOUTS IN CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 131 
situations where divergences in information between buyers and sellers 
are expected to be more extreme, buyers and sellers are more likely to 
rely on earnout provisions to bridge the valuation gap.12  Empirical 
evidence also supports the argument that the structure of earnout terms 
is intentionally designed to address the most critical sources of 
information asymmetries between buyers and sellers.13  This previous 
work generally supports an inference that earnouts exist to signal 
unobservable quality in response to adverse selection.  Consequently, 
the adverse selection hypothesis has become the dominant hypothesis in 
thinking about the role of contingent payments in merger agreements. 
Until recently, post-closing data related to earnouts has been 
extremely limited.  What happened to sellers during the post-closing 
period was not transparent to outside observers.  As a result, the range of 
questions that earlier studies could address was relatively narrow.  Gaps 
in the data meant that although one might be able to predict when parties 
are more likely to adopt contingent payment mechanisms in an 
acquisition, there was no reliable assessment of whether in fact parties 
relied on earnouts to generate credible information signals or in response 
to some other problem.  Not surprisingly, many gaps remain in our 
understanding of the role of earnout provisions in resolving the problem 
of adverse selection in contracting. 
This Article uses newly available “fair value” accounting data to help 
answer the question of whether sellers use contingent payment 
mechanisms in merger transactions to signal private information about 
their hidden value to potential buyers.14  New fair value accounting rules 
require acquirers to make disclosures about the expected value of 
contingent payments related to merger transactions.15  This new 
visibility into the post-closing period permits outside observers to test 
the power of earnouts to overcome information asymmetries and to 
make some inferences about the role contingent payments play in 
potentially resolving adverse selection problems.  I conduct difference 
of means tests on the fair value data to determine whether acquirers 
report learning new positive information about sellers during the post-
closing period and whether sellers appear to rely on earnouts to signal 
hidden information to acquirers.  A significant conclusion from the fair 
value data, one that contradicts previous findings, is that earnouts do not 
appear to function as credible information signals for high quality sellers 
 
1; see also Raggazinno & Reuer, supra note 1, at 3. 
 12. Datar et al., supra note 1, at 216–20. 
 13. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 32. 
 14. See generally FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FOUNDATION, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 141 (2007) [hereinafter SFAS 141R]. 
 15. Id. at 67–73. 
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who might rely on them to overcome adverse selection. 
 According to acquirer disclosures, during the first eight quarters 
following the announcement of the transaction, the average fair value of 
contingent payments reported by acquirers declined from 70% of the 
nominal value of the earnout to just under 55% of the nominal value.  
Similar declines are present across a variety of industrial sectors and 
contracting scenarios.  If sellers were relying on earnouts to signal 
private information, we would expect to see acquirers systematically 
confirm these statements during the post-closing period, thus providing 
a self-enforcing separating equilibrium between high and low quality 
sellers.  The fair value data observed here suggests acquirers are not 
learning new information that might confirm pre-signing seller 
statements during the post-closing period.  If earnouts do not permit 
high quality sellers to sort themselves from low quality sellers, earnouts 
lose one of the most important functions attributed to them by previous 
studies. 
The new fair value data provides support for the competing 
uncertainty hypothesis.  Where buyers and sellers may have different 
estimates for the probabilities of future events or states of the world due 
to uncertainty, these differences can generate transaction costs between 
the buyer and sellers.  The existence of such transaction costs in the 
merger agreement may violate the basic assumptions of efficient pricing 
theory and thus be an obstacle to successful contracting.16  Where 
symmetrical uncertainty rather than asymmetric information is the 
concern, the earnout may be an example of a contractual device that 
lawyers use to reduce transaction costs associated with uncertainty and 
create value for their clients.17  By reducing symmetrical uncertainty 
faced by parties in a transaction and assigning the probability of a 
negative outcome to sellers, earnouts can improve pricing efficiency.18  
 
 16. Gilson observed that the acquisition of a corporation is nothing more than the acquisition of a 
capital asset.  If that is true, then an efficient price for such an asset could be obtained through the 
application of an asset pricing model.  Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal 
Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L. J. 239, 241–47 (1984). 
 17. In his well-known article on value creation by lawyers, Professor Gilson studied the earnouts 
as a contractual device that can be used to create value: 
My hypothesis about what business lawyers really do-their potential to create value-is 
simply this: Lawyers function as transaction cost engineers, devising efficient 
mechanisms which bridge the gap between capital asset pricing theory’s hypothetical 
world of perfect markets and the less-than-perfect reality of effecting transactions in this 
world.  Value is created when the transactional structure designed by the business lawyer 
allows the parties to act, for that transaction, as if the assumptions on which capital asset 
pricing theory is based were accurate.   
Id. at 255. 
 18. Professor Gilson argued that earnouts assist parties in reaching efficient prices by resolving 
the problem of uncertainty in transactions.  Id. at 263–64. 
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The earnout may thus help facilitate contracting while not necessarily 
generating new information or resolving any adverse selection problem.  
To the extent the new fair value data does not support the adverse 
selection hypothesis, these results also inform the nascent study of 
transactional law, which posits that earnouts play an important role in 
generating pre-contractual information. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the earnout 
mechanism as it is commonly used in merger agreements.  Part III 
provides a brief overview of the competing hypotheses, adverse 
selection and uncertainty, to explain the reliance of parties on earnouts 
in merger agreements.  Part IV examines the contributions of financial 
economists who have examined the prevalence of earnouts and the 
structure of consideration in merger agreements.  In general, these 
previous studies have largely supported the proposition that earnouts are 
a contractual response to adverse selection in the deal making process.  
Part V provides an assessment of the fair value data for contingent 
payments using difference of means tests.  Part VI draws general 
conclusions from the fair value data.  In particular, the fair value data 
does not support the claim that earnouts are contractual responses to the 
problem of adverse selection.  The competing uncertainty hypothesis is 
a more likely explanation for parties’ reliance on the earnout provision.  
Finally, Part VII poses some remaining questions and alternative 
interpretations. 
II. THE EARNOUT MECHANISM 
An earnout provision is a contractual provision in a merger agreement 
that creates a contingent payment obligation for the acquirer.  The 
contingency is payable upon the seller achieving certain targets, 
financial or nonfinancial, during the post-closing period.  From the point 
of view of the buyer and seller, the goal of the earnout is to overcome 
significant valuation differences that may come between the parties 
during negotiations and prevent them from reaching agreement.19  
Through a contingent payment structure, the parties agree to disagree 
and defer the ultimate valuation question until a later point in time when 
the uncertainties with respect to valuation have been resolved.20  The 
earnout falls into a broader category of post-closing pricing adjustments 
that includes other devices like contingent value rights, escrows, 
indemnity funds, working capital adjustments, and bonus plans, among 
 
 19. See, e.g., BRUNER, supra note 1, at 613–17 (observing that differences with respect to 
expectations of future performance is a source of disagreements during acquisition negotiations); 
Framing Contract, supra note 3; Gilson, supra note 16, at 241–43. 
 20. See generally Gilson, supra note 6, at 263–65; FREUND, supra note 4, at 203–23. 
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others.21  All these provisions alter the structure of consideration in the 
merger transaction to create some opportunity for an ex post settling 
up.22  The opportunity for an ex post settling up is a central feature of 
the earnout provision. 
Corporate acquisitions are highly complex transactions that often 
involve large amounts of private information.  This private information 
may relate to the future prospects of the seller or status of the seller’s 
product that may be known only to the seller.  Although buyers engage 
in significant due diligence, it may be impossible, without great effort, 
for a buyer to uncover all of the private information that a seller may 
possess.  To the extent the seller’s private information is negative, a 
seller may have an incentive to shade it or downplay its importance.  
Sellers may also find it difficult to convey positive information to the 
buyer in a way that is credible.23  In addition to information problems, 
there may also be fundamental disagreements about the future of the 
seller or the seller’s industry that can negatively impact the acquirer’s 
valuation of the seller.24  These fundamental disagreements often reflect 
the high degree of uncertainty that is present in a complex merger 
transaction.  Consequently, buyers and sellers may find themselves 
unable to agree on an appropriate valuation for the seller.  By providing 
parties with an ex post opportunity to settle up, the earnout provision 
helps fill the valuation gap between buyers and sellers generated either 
by information asymmetries or uncertainty.  In effect, the parties rely on 
the contingent payment mechanism to come to a final determination of 
the sellers during the post-closing period after the acquirer has had an 
opportunity to learn the seller’s private information or after uncertainties 
affecting valuation have been resolved. 
The content of earnout provisions are extremely heterogeneous and 
 
 21. BRUNER, supra note 1, at 610; E. THOM RUMBERGER, JR. ET AL., THE ACQUISITION AND 
SALE OF EMERGING GROWTH COMPANY: THE M&A EXIT § 5 (2009); Leigh Walton & Kevin D. Kreb, 
Purchase Price Adjustments, Earnouts, and Other Purchase Price Provisions (Dec. 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 22. Escrows and indemnity funds provide for clawbacks in the event it turns out at some point 
following closing that the seller’s representations and warranties were not true when made.  In their 
traditional CVRs use provide for additional post-closing payments to the seller in the event the 
acquirer’s stock—its acquisition currency—is not as valuable post-closing as had been anticipated at the 
time of the transaction.  RUMBERGER, supra note 21, § 9.  The CVR as described here differs from the 
CVR described in the Genzyme/Sanofi transaction.  The Genzyme/Sanofi CVR is better described as a 
tradable earnout security. 
 23. Mere statements by the seller revealing positive private information about the seller, without 
more, may be misinterpreted by the potential buyer as being no more than “cheap talk” and therefore not 
a credible source of information about the seller.  See Joseph Farrell & Robert Gibbons, Cheap Talk Can 
Matter in Bargaining, 48 J. ECON. THEORY 221 (1989) (arguing however that although talk without the 
consequences of potential sanction is expected to be uninformative, under some circumstances, cheap 
talk can be useful in bargaining). 
 24. See generally Gilson, supra note 16; FREUND, supra note 4. 
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context dependent.  However, earnout provisions have certain common 
features that can be found in all such provisions.  First, earnout 
provisions tie the payment of additional merger consideration to the 
seller’s accomplishment of certain specified targets or milestones during 
the post-closing period.25  Earnout targets are often proxies for seller or 
seller product performance and fall into one of two general categories: 
financial or nonfinancial targets.26  Financial targets may include some 
measure of top-line revenues, cash flow, EBITDA, profitability, or other 
costs that can be directly tied back to the financial performance of the 
seller.27  Nonfinancial targets may include some nonfinancial proxy for 
revenue—for example, unit sales or licenses.  Alternatively, 
nonfinancial targets may include market share targets, or specific 
customer-oriented goals.  Nonfinancial targets may also include certain 
technological achievements or regulatory approvals, such as FDA 
approval for medical devices and pharmaceutical products.28 
Second, parties may negotiate triggers for contingent payments in a 
number of forms: sliding scale, cliffs, or binary.  Binary triggers are 
common and relatively easy to administer.  Binary triggers authorize 
payment of the earnout only upon the meeting of the stated milestone.  
Nonfinancial targets, like regulatory approval, are amenable to binary 
payment milestones.  A product either receives regulatory approval and 
is therefore valuable to the acquirer or it does not and is therefore less 
valuable.  For example, one of the payment triggers in the Genzyme 
earnout was related to the government approval for a new drug in the 
Genzyme pipeline.29  The uncertainty about the prospect of receiving 
government approval had a material effect on the acquirer’s valuation of 
the seller.  The source of that uncertainty may have been endogenous—
the seller had information about the likelihood of receiving government 
approval that it was unable to credibly convey to the acquirer—or it may 
have been exogenous, a result of symmetrical uncertainty. 
Though binary milestones are appropriate in some circumstances, 
they may not be appropriate all the time.  Binary milestones may 
sometimes run afoul of other incentive issues.  For example, if it 
becomes apparent to the seller that she will not be able to achieve the 
milestone, the seller may have little incentive to exert any efforts to 
meet the goal.  In response to this potential problem, drafters sometimes 
rely on incremental milestones or sliding scale payments.  Incremental 
 
 25. RUMBERGER, supra note 21, § 5:60–74. 
 26. See id.; Walton & Kreb, supra note 21; BRUNER, supra note 1, at 610. 
 27. ABA, THE M&A PROCESS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE BUSINESS LAWYER 147–48 
(2005). 
 28. See generally Walton & Kreb, supra note 21; BRUNER, supra note 1, at 610–11. 
 29. Genzyme Questions, supra note 9. 
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milestones recognize that there may be negative incentive effects 
associated with a “cliff.”30  The Genzyme contingent payment also 
included a series of incremental milestones tied to various levels of 
revenues achieved by the seller.31  Sliding scale triggers are a further 
variation on the incremental milestones.  Sliding scale payments do 
away with the potentially negative incentive effects of a cliff by acting 
like royalties, payable as a percentage of revenue, or profits or some 
other continuous variable that the parties have identified.  Of course, the 
downside of such an approach is that it rewards satisficing behavior by 
sellers rather than incentivizing maximization of the threshold targets by 
sellers. 
Third, the length of earnouts typically varies anywhere between one 
and five years.  In general, the term of the earnout provision should be 
long enough to resolve the uncertainty that caused the fundamental 
disagreement over valuation.32  Fourth, the size of an earnout relative to 
the total consideration in the transaction also varies.  In general, the size 
typically reflects the degree of uncertainty between the parties with 
respect to the seller’s value.33  To the extent the duration and the size of 
the earnout are long and large enough to overcome the uncertainty that 
gives rise to the valuation differences between the parties, the earnout 
mechanism is an appropriate device to address valuation disagreements. 
In addition to questions of size and duration of the earnout, the degree 
of autonomy and control over the seller’s business during the post-
closing period is often central to the negotiation of the provision.  
Control and autonomy are important because the likelihood that the 
seller’s shareholders will receive any contingent payments is tied to the 
ability of continuing employees to take actions that will maximize the 
seller’s value with respect to the earnout targets.34  To the extent selling 
shareholders will not continue their involvement with the seller post-
closing and to the degree buyers do not to keep the seller apart from the 
parent, buyers may face incentives to undermine the implementation of 
the earnout in an effort to reduce their payment obligations under the 
earnout provision—a moral hazard. 
III. COMPETING HYPOTHESES: ADVERSE SELECTION AND UNCERTAINTY 
Practitioners often refer to the “valuation gap” that comes between 
 
 30. See generally Walton & Kreb, supra note 21. 
 31. Genzyme Corp., Contingent Value Right Agreement (Exhibit to Form 8-K) (Mar. 6, 2010). 
 32. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 151; Gilson, supra note 16, at 268–69. 
 33. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 151–53; Gilson, supra note 16, at 267–69. 
 34. See generally Walton & Kreb, supra note 21; BRUNER, supra note 1, at 610–13; 
RUMBERGER, supra note 21, § 5:60–65. 
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buyers and sellers during merger negotiations.35  The valuation gap 
refers to the pricing difference between what the seller believes itself to 
be worth and what the buyer is willing to pay.  The earnout is a 
contractual response to this valuation gap and helps parties bridge their 
differences.  There are two competing hypotheses to explain why the 
earnout mechanism is able to resolve the differences between parties.  
The dominant hypothesis is advanced by financial economists and legal 
scholars who believe the earnout is a contractual response to adverse 
selection.  According to this view, by resolving information 
asymmetries, the earnout helps parties overcome contracting challenges 
that might otherwise inhibit parties coming to agreement.  The second 
hypothesis is advanced by practitioners and legal scholars who believe 
the earnout mechanism resolves the problem of pre-contractual 
uncertainty rather than adverse selection.  In this view, symmetrical 
uncertainty, rather than adverse selection, is the cause of the contracting 
challenge.  By creating uniform expectations about future events, parties 
are able assign the costs of adverse outcomes to the party best able to 
accept them and proceed to agreement. 
Professor George Akerlof analyzed the problem of adverse selection 
in his well-known paper on the “lemons market.”36  A lemons market 
arises when, prior to contracting, it is expensive or otherwise difficult 
for acquirers to accurately distinguish between high quality and low 
quality sellers.37  Because buyers are unable to distinguish between 
sellers, they offer only the average price for a pool including both high 
and low quality types.  If left unresolved, high quality sellers exit the 
market, leaving only low quality sellers, and the lemons market 
collapses.  Professor Akerlof illustrated this problem by proposing a 
thought experiment with a used car market where the sellers had 
information about the quality of the car they had available for sale that 
was unavailable to potential buyers.38  Potential acquirers knew only 
that the pool of used cars available for sale included both low quality 
and high quality cars.  Consequently, potential acquirers price their 
offers equal to the expected value of a pool of sellers that includes both 
low and high quality sellers.  High quality sellers know their own 
valuations and withhold their cars from the market, leaving only low 
quality cars, or lemons, in the market.39  In a market where high quality 
sellers are unable to distinguish themselves from low quality sellers, this 
 
 35. See, e.g., FREUND, supra note 4, at 214–17. 
 36. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
 37. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 48 (6th ed. 2012). 
 38. Akerlof, supra note 36, at 489–92. 
 39. See id. at 489–97. 
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information asymmetry can mean that otherwise socially valuable 
transactions do not go forward. 
Sellers understand this problem and can engage in signaling behavior 
to overcome adverse selection.40  In order for signals to help buyers and 
sellers overcome the problem of adverse selection, the seller must be 
able to convey information about its unobservable quality to the buyer.  
The distinguishing feature of a credible signal is the cost to low quality 
types who make the statement.  This cost feature creates separation in 
the marketplace between high and low quality types.41  Because signals 
are costly to low quality sellers, sellers who know they are a low quality 
type have incentives to avoid making such statements.42  High quality 
sellers, on the other hand, are willing and able to make relatively costly 
contingent statements because they know they will not likely have to 
incur the costs associated with incorrect statements.  The relative cost 
differences faced by high and low quality sellers leads to a self-
separation in the market as high quality sellers reveal themselves to 
buyers in a way that buyers can believe.43  In the context of Akerlof’s 
used cars, a seller might offer a warranty on the quality of the car as an 
example of a costly signal to demonstrate the seller’s confidence in its 
unobservable quality.44  A warranty would be costly to the seller if the 
seller had hidden information about the quality of the seller’s car that 
indicated it was a low quality type.  Therefore, low quality sellers are 
less likely to offer warranties and stand by their cars during the post-
closing period than would a high quality seller.  This commitment to a 
post-closing warranty obligation separates the market into high and low 
quality sellers in a way that buyers can easily observe. 
In the merger context, costly contingent commitments by sellers may 
play a role similar to that of warranties in Akerlof’s lemons market.  
Deferring payments until post-closing may permit drafters to more 
closely align the valuation question with the sources of potential 
information asymmetries.  By deferring the valuation decision until 
 
 40. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 329 
(2007); see also Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973) (modeling the hiring 
decision as one where there is asymmetric information with respect to the unobservable quality of 
applicants, with applicants investing in education in order to signal their quality to potential employers). 
 41. RASMUSEN, supra note 40, at 329; IAN MOLHO, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: LYING 
AND CHEATING IN MARKETS AND ORGANIZATIONS 63 (1997). 
 42. Cf. RASMUSEN, supra note 40; Spence, supra note 40. 
 43. Cf. RASMUSEN, supra note 40; Spence, supra note 40. 
 44. Akerlof also suggested a number of other institutional responses to overcoming adverse 
selection, including branding, licensing, and franchises.  See Akerlof, supra note 36, at 499–500.  In the 
insurance industry, which is an industry often beset by adverse selection problems, insurance companies 
rely on copayments and deductibles to help resolve the problem of adverse selection.  COOTER & ULEN, 
supra note 37, at 49.  Molho observes that advertising is a form of signaling behavior that high quality 
sellers can use to demonstrate unobservable quality.  MOLHO, supra note 41 at 95. 
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post-closing, sellers can create credible information signals and thereby 
help resolve potential adverse selection problems.45  On the other hand, 
sellers who have hidden information about their quality that suggests the 
seller is a low quality seller will avoid accepting contingent 
consideration, as such a structure is costly to the seller.  Sellers with 
hidden information that suggests the seller is a high quality seller may 
be more likely to agree to accept contingent payments because they are 
more confident that they will receive the payments during the post-
closing period when the uncertainty is resolved in their favor.  By 
helping high quality sellers convey hidden information about the 
unobservable quality of the seller to potential buyers, the earnout can 
help separate the high quality sellers from the low quality sellers.  Thus, 
the earnout may help resolve the problem of adverse selection.46 
An alternative view on the utility of earnouts is that buyers and sellers 
rely on them to resolve the problem of uncertainty.47  Uncertainty about 
future events can adversely affect the ability of buyers and sellers to 
reach agreement on valuation of an asset.  Professor Frank Knight 
distinguished between “risk” and “uncertainty.”48  The first represents 
an unknown but calculable outcome, while the second represents an 
outcome whose ex ante probabilities are essentially unknowable.49  To 
the extent negative outcomes are tied to asymmetric information, 
including adverse selection, the ex ante probabilities of negative 
outcomes are calculable.  Those potential negative outcomes are 
categorized as “risks” in a Knightian sense.50  Where there are risks, the 
party with the structural information advantage is best positioned to 
accept the risks of negative outcomes because that party is in the best 
 
 45. HOWARD L. SHECTER, Earnouts, in ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD 
COMPANY 839 (2011) (“[W]e are worth more than you have offered and we can prove it.”). 
 46. Leland and Pyle observed that because entrepreneurs, or private sellers, have more 
information about their companies than acquirers or other outsiders, transactions with these parties are 
highly susceptible to the problem of adverse selection.  See generally Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, 
Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371 (1977).  
Freund relies on the language of “lemons” to imply that what is at stake with respect to merger 
transactions is adverse selection.  See FREUND, supra note 4, at 203. 
 47. BRUNER, supra note 1, at 615–16; see also Edward D. Herlihy et al., Contingent 
Consideration in Bridging Valuation Gaps, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM, Apr. 25, 2012, 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/04/25/contingent-consideration-in-bridging-valuation-gaps/ 
(observing that earnouts are valuable contract provisions in situations of great uncertainty). 
 48. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 1–10 (1921). 
 49. Id. at 1–22. 
 50. The finance literature has taken to use the term “ambiguity” in place of Knight’s 
“uncertainty” to differentiate uncertainty from more conventional risk.  See, e.g., Larry G. Epstein & 
Martin Schneider, Learning Under Ambiguity, 74 REV. ECON. STUD. 1275 (2006); Zhengjing Chen & 
Larry Epstein, Ambiguity, Risk, and Asset Returns in Continuous Time, 70 ECONOMETRICA 1403 (2002); 
see also Peter Bossaerts, Paolo Ghirardato, Serena Guarnaschelli & William R. Zame, Ambiguity in 
Asset Markets: Theory and Experiment, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1325 (2010). 
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position to prevent the negative result from occurring.  The presence of 
uncertainty, on the other hand, can present different obstacles to parties 
wishing to engage in a transaction.  A characteristic of uncertainty, or 
ambiguity, is that neither party has an ex ante structural advantage with 
respect to knowing whether or not the adverse outcome will come to 
pass.  In that sense, neither party is necessarily best positioned to accept 
the consequences of a negative outcome, as is the case when information 
is asymmetric. 
Professor Gilson observed that where parties have fundamentally 
different views of the future or different preferences for risk, uncertainty 
may form a barrier to successful contracting because buyers and sellers 
may be unable to efficiently price the seller’s asset.51  According to 
Professor Gilson, asset pricing theory assumes that buyers and sellers of 
a capital asset, like a corporation, share joint expectations about the 
future.52  Expectations for the future are intimately tied to risk 
preferences.  Where parties do not share the same preferences for risk, 
such differences may also undermine efficient pricing.  Entrepreneurs 
are, by their nature, more risk-loving (that is, they accept larger 
variances around the mean outcome) than acquirers.  Where buyers and 
sellers do not share the same preference for risk, these differences may 
violate the assumption of joint expectations leading parties to find 
themselves unable to reach a pricing agreement.  In this case, the 
challenge for buyers and sellers is not asymmetric information as neither 
side necessarily has any informational advantage with respect to the 
underlying probabilities of future states of the world.  Rather, the 
challenge for parties is uncertainty and the differences between the 
buyer’s and the seller’s risk preferences. 
If the parties can agree on a transaction structure that resolves 
uncertainty and distributes the relevant probability of an adverse event 
to the party with the larger preference for variation, then the parties may 
be able to create uniform assumptions and then generate an efficient 
price for the seller.53  In this alternate view, uncertainty, rather than 
information asymmetries, presents challenges to successful contracting.  
Transaction structures, like earnouts, can reduce ex ante uncertainty and 
normalize joint expectations with respect to the future value of the 
seller.54  The earnout permits buyers to reduce the likelihood that they 
will overpay for a seller in the event the future turns out not to be as rosy 
 
 51. Professor Ronald Gilson argued that the role of the earnout is to resolve uncertainty and 
thereby permit parties to efficiently price the sale of the corporate asset.  See Gilson, supra note 16, at 
262–65. 
 52. Id. at 249–57. 
 53. Id. at 249–65. 
 54. Id. 
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as sellers predicted.  Sellers bear the potential cost of their optimism.  
Note that sellers do not necessarily have any particular insights into 
future states of the world.  With an earnout, the sellers simply agree to 
bear the costs of being wrong without generating any information for a 
potential acquirer. 
The competing adverse selection and uncertainty hypotheses are 
mutually exclusive hypotheses.  In order for earnouts to function as a 
credible information signal, earnouts have to be able to generate a 
separating equilibrium.55  Where there is a separating equilibrium, the 
seller’s choice of contract type, in this case, one including an earnout, 
conveys private information from sellers to buyers.56  In a separating 
equilibrium, only high quality sellers should self-select into the group of 
sellers agreeing to earnout provisions in merger agreements.  By virtue 
of the seller’s choice of contract, buyers should be able to infer 
something about the unobservable quality of the seller. 
If, on the other hand, the equilibrium is “pooled,” with both low and 
high quality buyers choosing to rely on earnout provisions, the earnout 
loses its value as an information signal.57 When both high and low 
quality sellers select the same contractual provision, potential buyers are 
unable to rely on that selection to infer any information about the 
seller’s unobservable quality.  Where a pooling equilibrium can be 
observed, contractual provisions, like earnouts, lose their signaling 
power.  In that case, it is more likely that buyers and sellers adopting 
earnout provisions are doing so to resolve uncertainty.  Where the 
parties rely on earnouts to resolve uncertainty, the parties do not intend 
to convey information by their choice of contractual provision.  Because 
there is no expectation that contracts with earnouts in such case will or 
should reveal a separating equilibrium, a pooling equilibrium is 
consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis.58 
IV. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH SUPPORTS ADVERSE SELECTION 
HYPOTHESIS 
Of the two competing hypotheses, the adverse selection hypothesis is 
the dominant hypothesis amongst legal scholars and financial 
economists.59  Previous research on the prevalence of contingent 
 
 55. See LOUIS PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 122 (1988) (defining a 
separating equilibrium). 
 56. Cf. id.; see also RASMUSEN, supra note 40, at 248: ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL 
NORMS 175–76 (2000) (defining a separating equilibrium). 
 57. See Phlips, supra note 55 (defining a pooling equilibrium). 
 58. This is because the results of uncertainty are necessarily a random distribution around a mean 
and not necessarily weighted in favor of positive results. 
 59. See Framing Contract, supra note 3; Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in 
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payments in corporate acquisitions provides evidence to support the 
claim that contingent payment provisions may be contractual responses 
to the lemons problem.60  Where there is unobservable information 
about the quality of the seller, sellers can rely on contractual devices to 
signal to potential acquirers the credibility of statements they make 
regarding their private information.61  Absent a signaling mechanism 
like an earnout, sellers may have difficulty in credibly conveying their 
unobservable quality to potential buyers.62  In the extreme, these 
difficulties might lead to otherwise valuable transactions not going 
forward.63  Because there is evidence that parties rely on earnout 
mechanisms in circumstances where one expects information 
asymmetries to be severe, the conclusion that earnouts may be a 
contractual response to adverse selection seems reasonable.64 
Contingent payments may act as a screening device to assist sellers to 
signal their unobservable quality to uninformed buyers.65  Faced with 
the potential for adverse selection, high quality sellers cannot rely on 
mere statements about their underlying quality to differentiate 
themselves from low quality sellers in the pool of potential sellers.  Such 
statements lack credibility.  Statements can gain credibility when they 
are costly to the seller in the event they are incorrect.66  When sellers are 
able to make credible statements regarding unobservable data, such 
statements help facilitate exchange between sellers with private 
information and uninformed buyers by reducing information 
 
Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 861 (2010) (observing that 
earnouts are a response to information asymmetries present in the merger transaction). 
 60. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 151–53; Datar et al., supra note 1, at 201–04; Kohers & Ang, 
supra note 1, at 445–48; Ragozzino & Reuer, supra note 1, at 1–5.  These studies all pre-date the 
implementation of SFAS 141(R).  See SFAS 141R, supra note 14.  As a result, they are limited to 
collection data on the prevalence of contingent earnout provisions from publicly available sources as 
well as certain attributes of the transaction.  The Datar et al. and Kohers & Ang studies provided some 
information on the prevalence of payments.  This data was taken from a small sample survey and also 
collected from SEC filings.  At the time that data was collected there was no uniform reporting 
methodology, so the results of these investigations may be difficult to interpret. 
 61. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of “Screening,” Education, and the Distribution of Income, 65 
AM. ECON. REV. 283, 283–84 (1975). 
 62. Cf. id. 
 63. See Akerlof, supra note 36. 
 64. See generally Cain et al., supra note 1; Datar et al., supra note 1; Kohers & Ang, supra note 
1; Ragozzino & Reuer, supra note 1, Walton & Kreb, supra note 21.  Previous work often uses 
“uncertainty” and “adverse selection” interchangeably.  See, e.g., Cain et al., supra note 1.  However, 
here I distinguish between adverse selection where sellers have private information with respect to a 
particular unknown outcome and symmetrical uncertainty where neither party has an informational 
advantage. 
 65. See Framing Contract, supra note 3; Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the 
Informational Structure of Markets, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 434 (2002); cf. Spence, supra note 40, at 355–
60; Stiglitz, supra note 61. 
 66. See generally Framing Contract, supra note 3; Spence, supra note 65. 
16
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/3
2012] EARNOUTS IN CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 143 
asymmetries. 
Previous studies of earnout provisions have examined the appearance 
of contingent payment devices in merger agreements and generally 
found their use consistent with adverse selection hypothesis for earnout 
provisions.  For example, Professors Kohers and Ang examined the 
prevalence of earnout provisions in 938 completed merger transactions 
with earnouts over the period 1984 to 1996 and concluded that earnouts 
serve two pricing functions: ensure buyers do not overpay for low 
quality targets (adverse selection) and reduce any symmetric uncertainty 
with respect to valuation.67  Professors Datar, Frankel, and Wolfson also 
examined the use of earnout provisions in a sample of merger 
agreements from the years 1990–1997 to study the relationship of 
buyer/seller characteristics and the likelihood of an earnout.68  The data 
suggest that in situations where buyers can reasonably expect severe 
information asymmetries, sellers are more likely to agree to earnout 
provisions.  Datar et al. concluded that earnouts are a contractual 
response to the problem of adverse selection because sellers need 
credible means to signal private information to buyers.69  
Professors Ragazzino and Reuer studied the occurrence of contingent 
payments in merger agreements and concluded that contingent earnouts 
permit parties to proceed with an acquisition in the face of asymmetric 
information.  In absence of the earnout provision, Ragazzino and Reuer 
hypothesize that parties might be required to rely on alternate 
transaction structures (i.e. toeholds) to overcome adverse selection 
problems or not to proceed with a transaction at all.70  Ragazzino and 
Reuer find that one of the key benefits of contingent earnouts is to 
reduce the risk of overpayment due to adverse selection while rewarding 
high quality sellers by permitting them to receive higher prices.71 
In a more recent study of the structure of earnout provisions, 
Professors Cain and Denis conclude that the structure of earnout 
provisions is generally consistent with the goal of resolving “adverse 
selection/uncertainty” problems and generating ex post incentives to 
mitigate the risk of moral hazard amongst continuing shareholders.72  
 
 67. See Kohers & Ang, supra note 1, at 451–65.  Kohers and Ang also find evidence that 
contingent payments provide ex post incentives for continuing managers.  Id. at 448.  Reduction of 
symmetric uncertainty is consistent with Gilson’s view of the role of earnouts to resolve uncertainty and 
improve pricing for capital assets.  See Gilson, supra note 16 (applying the capital asset pricing model to 
the pricing of acquisition targets). 
 68. Datar et al, supra note 1, at 203. 
 69. Datar et al., supra note 1, at 201–03. 
 70. Ragozzino & Reuer, supra note 1, at 1–11. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 158–59.  Cain et al. conflate the concepts of adverse selection 
and uncertainty.  For example Cain et al. describe uncertainty in a way that is easily interpreted as 
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They find that the size of earnouts is correlated with certain proxies for 
the risk involved.73  For example, they find that private targets, where 
information asymmetries are presumably larger, accept larger earnouts 
than publicly traded targets that accept earnouts, though they do not find 
differences in the size of earnouts where the acquirer and the target cross 
industries.74  They also find that the earnout period is longer where a 
time might be helpful in resolving the uncertainty in question.75  Finally, 
they find that when parties select particular earnout targets or triggers, 
parties tend to use triggers that are associated with lower information 
asymmetries (i.e. sales over profits).76 
In general, this previous empirical work suggests that where one 
expects severe information asymmetries between buyer and seller, 
buyers and sellers rely on earnouts to overcome these problems.  For 
example, although earnouts tend to be present in a relatively small 
percentage (3–7%) of the overall pool of acquisition transactions, 
earnouts are much more common in transactions where the seller is a 
private firm.77  Consistent with that observation, the American Bar 
Association’s 2011 Deal Point’s study of merger agreements involving 
private sellers observes that earnouts are present in 38% of transactions 
in its sample.78  Professors Koher and Ang found contingent earnouts to 
be more common in sellers with fewer shareholders where presumably 
selling shareholders have more private information about the seller.79  
Professors Datar et al. also found earnouts to be more prevalent in sales 
 
adverse selection when they state, “only targets who truly believe they are valued higher will be willing 
to accept contracts in which large portions of their payoffs are contingent on future performance.  Thus, 
uncertainty-based models predict that earnouts will be larger when there is more uncertainty regarding 
target value.”  Id. at 158. 
 73. Id. at 158–160. 
 74. Id. at 159. 
 75. Id. at 158–62. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Datar et al., supra note 1, at 220 (earnouts present in 5% of private company transactions 
while in less than 1% of public company transactions).  See also Kohers & Ang, supra note 1, at 454 
(observing that 66% of their earnout sample involved private company sellers, while earnouts involving 
public company sellers were less than 5% of the entire sample)  Ragozzino and Reuer found earnouts 
present in 5% of private company transactions in their sample.  Ragozzino & Reuer, supra note 1, at 8.  
Cain et al. observe earnouts in 3.9% of transactions in their sample.  Cain et al., supra note 1, at 153.  
Bruner provides a summary of a number of studies which surveyed the prevalence of earnouts in 
transactions as a whole.  See BRUNER, supra note 1, at 612.  In transactions involving public company 
targets contingent payment provisions are rare.  To the extent contingent payments are present in the 
public company seller context, parties tend to rely on CVR rather than earnouts.  If registered, the CVR 
can be publicly traded.  Of course, a publicly traded contingent payment device may have less incentive 
power than an earnout because the seller can immediately dispose of the risk of adverse consequences 
through sales of the CVR in the public markets. 
 78. See ABA, supra note 10. 
 79. Kohers & Ang, supra note 1, at 446. 
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of corporate subsidiaries or divestitures of product lines.80  The 
prevalence of earnout transactions in smaller, privately-held firms and 
divestitures of subsidiaries of public companies is consistent with a view 
that earnouts respond to potential adverse selection.  In sales of private 
companies or subsidiaries, shareholders are more likely to have access 
to private information about the seller than in transactions involving 
public company sellers, where there is no reason to suspect that the 
widely dispersed shareholder base of the typical public company has any 
access to private information about the seller. 
In other situations where potential acquirers presumably have less 
access to information about the sellers, sellers are more likely to agree to 
earnouts.  For example, where the acquirer and the target are from two 
different industrial sectors, and the information hurdles are likely greater 
for the acquirer, one finds buyers and sellers relying more heavily on 
earnout provisions.81  This finding is consistent with arguments that 
adverse selection is the motivating factor for the earnout.  In certain 
sectors subject to rapid technical and economic growth, one might also 
expect there to be a significant amount of private information.  In fact, 
transactions involving high technology and business services sector 
targets have a higher tendency to include earnouts than banks and other 
old line businesses where information about industry participants and 
the sector is better-known.82 
On the other hand, one would expect where the acquirer has 
significant information about the seller, and where one expects there to 
be less private information about the seller, that parties would tend not 
to rely on transaction structures with contingent consideration.  In fact, 
earnouts are less prevalent in transactions in industrial sectors that are 
characterized by larger numbers of mergers and acquisitions, suggesting 
that where acquirers can evaluate the seller in comparison to a large 
number of other recent acquisitions in the same sector, the acquirer is 
 
 80. Datar et al., supra note 1, at 217–18 (rejecting the null hypothesis that the prevalence of 
earnouts in transactions involving subsidiaries is equal to the prevalence of earnouts in all transactions 
in the sample). 
 81. Datar et al., supra note 1, at 227; see also Reuer & Ragozzino, supra note 1, at 17. 
 82. 12.96% of computer and software (SIC 5045) in their sample employed earnouts, while 
0.00% of transactions involving savings institutions (SIC 6035) employed them.  Datar et al., supra note 
1, at 222.  Approximately one-quarter of the transactions employing earnouts in Kohers and Ang’s 
sample involved private company sellers in the high-technology sector.  Kohers & Ang, supra note 1, at 
454.  Ragazzino and Reuer found that approximately 50% of transactions in their sample involved 
earnouts with firms engaged in services, 26.5% in manufacturing and less than 10% engaged in finance, 
insurance, and real estate.  Ragazzino, supra note 1, at 8.  Cain et al. make a similar observation with 
33% of targets with earnouts in only five industries computer programming and data processing, 
management and public relations services, pharmaceuticals, electronic components, and medical 
devices.  Cain et al., supra note 1, at 153. 
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less concerned about the possible presence of hidden information.83 
Finally, one would expect that in transactions that involve insiders 
(i.e. management buyouts) there would be fewer earnout provisions than 
in other types of transactions.  With management on both sides of the 
transaction, representatives of the acquirer have as much—if not more—
information than the sellers.  As a result, there is little benefit or reason 
for the acquirer to rely on an earnout.  Consistent with this, Datar et al. 
found that where managers participate with the acquiring group, there 
are very few earnouts present.84 
These previous studies all support the hypothesis that parties use 
contingent earnouts in their merger agreements to respond to the 
problem of adverse selection.  However, because of data limitations, the 
focus of these previous studies has generally been limited to claims 
about the profiles of acquirers and sellers who might be expected to rely 
on earnouts and when one might expect these provisions to appear in 
merger agreements.  Because sellers are typically small, privately-held 
firms, there has been little or no information from the post-closing 
period about earnouts and earnout payments until recently.  The next 
Part of this Article outlines recent changes in disclosure rules related to 
earnouts.  These new rules require the disclosure of the expected value 
of all contingent payments in connection with corporate acquisitions.  
The additional transparency provided for by these new rules creates an 
opportunity to analyze the use and performance of earnouts in ways that 
were previously impossible. 
V. THE FAIR VALUE DISCLOSURE OF CONTINGENT PAYMENTS 
Until recently, observers have had relatively little information about 
the performance of earnouts post-closing.  Whether earnouts helped 
reveal private information, resolved uncertainty, or whether earnouts 
were ever actually paid largely escaped analysis for lack of data.  The 
FASB recently implemented changes in the rules governing the 
accounting for acquisitions, including adoption of the SFAS 141(R), 
which went into effect for all companies reporting according to 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), beginning with 
acquisitions made after December 15, 2008.85  These recent changes 
 
 83. Datar et al., supra note 1, at 223, 232. 
 84. Id. at 212. 
 85. SFAS 141R, supra note 14, at vi.  For a discussion of the implementation of these rules see 
Peter Woodlock & Gang Peng, How Will Valuation Changes Affect M&A Deals?, 20 J. CORP. ACC. & 
FIN. 49 (2009); see also PAMELA YANAKOPULOS & RETO MICHELUZZI, Mergers & Acquisitions—A 
Snapshot: Accounting For Contingent Consideration—Don’t Let Earnouts Lead To Earnings Surprises, 
in MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 2010: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW NOW  (2010); Elaine Henry, Oscar J. 
Holzmann & Ya-wen Yang, Business Combinations: Accounting Standards Converge, 19 J. CORP. 
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make it possible for the first time to gain insight into the post-closing 
performance of earnout provisions.86 
Under previous accounting rules, contingent payments, like earnouts, 
were not required to be disclosed at the time of the acquisition.  Rather, 
contingent payments were only accounted for at some later point in the 
time when the contingency became due or was written off through an 
adjustment to the acquirer’s accounting for goodwill.87  Because such 
adjustments were not directly tied to the merger transaction, the 
acquirer’s financial statements were not transparent with respect to the 
treatment of the contingent payments.  The lack of transparency in the 
acquirer’s financial statements made it difficult for outsiders to observe 
the actual performance of earnouts (whether acquirers paid them or 
wrote them off) since contingent payments were only recorded if and 
when they were actually earned.88  The lack of transparency sometimes 
made it difficult to identify whether a particular transaction included any 
component of contingent consideration at all. 
Under the new SFAS 141(R), contingent consideration must now be 
disclosed separately in the footnotes of the acquirer’s financial 
disclosures (Forms 10-Q and 10-K) and recognized at its “fair value” on 
the acquisition date.89  The fair value is the price that would be received 
to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction 
between market participants at the measurement date.90  Acquirers are 
required to reevaluate that fair value periodically until the contingency is 
resolved.  When the acquirer revisits its valuation of the earnout 
obligation, the fair value must represent the expected value to the 
acquirer of the earnout obligation coming due.  Gains or losses in the 
fair value of contingent payments are recognized explicitly on the 
acquirer’s income statement.91  Contingencies may be resolved either by 
making payment on the earnout, writing off the earnout, or some 
 
ACCT. & FIN. 73 (2008); Christine Andrews et al., SFAS 141(R): Global Convergence and Massive 
Changes in M&A Accounting, 7 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 125 (2009); Jack T. Ciesielski & Thomas R. 
Weirich, Business Combinations: New Accounting Guidance, 20 J. CORP. ACCT. & FIN. 69 (2009). 
 86. In their 2001 study, Kohers & Ang collected data from the public filings on earnout 
payments.  They recognized their data were limited by the opacity of disclosure requirements with 
respect to contingent payments.  See Kohers & Ang, supra note 1.  Cain et al. note that accounting 
changes will make a study like this one possible.  See Cain et al., supra note 1. 
 87. See SFAS 141R, supra note 14; Andrews et al., supra note 85, at 127. 
 88. See Marc Asbra & Karen Miles, The Valuation of Earn-outs and Acquired Contingencies 
under SFAS 141(R), 79 CPA J. 38 (2009). 
 89. See SFAS 141R, supra note 14, at 2. 
 90. Id.  This approach to establishing the fair value of an earnout is consistent with fair value 
accounting for other intangible (Level III) assets.  It relies on an acquirer’s forward looking estimate of 
probable cash flows associated with the earnout in order to determine a fair value for the contingent 
liability. 
 91. Id. at 8. 
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combination of the two. 
To the extent acquirers receive new information about the seller in the 
post-closing period, SFAS 141(R) creates some degree of transparency 
into the performance of earnouts and the acquisition of information by 
the acquirer.  For example, after the closing of a transaction with an 
earnout, when the acquirer learns private information that causes the 
seller to change its estimation about the likelihood of the earnout 
becoming payable, this new information must be incorporated into the 
then-current fair value of the earnout.  If the new information received 
during the measuring period indicates an increased likelihood of 
payment—because the target is meeting its objectives under the earnout 
provision or is otherwise in line to meet those objectives—the acquirer 
is required to increase the fair value of the earnout to reflect the 
increased likelihood that the acquirer will have to make payment.  When 
the acquirer raises the fair value estimate, it must reduce its goodwill by 
an equivalent amount.  On the other hand, if the acquirer receives 
information following the closing of a transaction that indicates the 
target is less likely to meet the earnout objectives, thus decreasing the 
likelihood that the acquirer will be required to make payment on the 
earnout, then the acquirer must reduce the fair value estimate of the 
earnout.  When the acquirer reduces the fair value of a contingent 
obligation, the acquirer records an equivalent increase in earnings, or a 
“bargain purchase” on its income statement.92  The result of these rule 
changes is to require acquirers to disclose to the marketplace whether 
they receive positive or negative information related to the seller’s 
progress in achieving the earnout during the post-closing period. 
The example of OptionsXpress and Optionetics demonstrates how 
these rules are put into practice.93  In 2009, OptionsXpress acquired 
Optionetics in a merger transaction for $18.4 million plus contingent 
payments of up to $35 million, payable in the event Optionetics met 
certain financial, technical, and other performance targets during the two 
year period following closing.  Under previous accounting rules, the 
acquisition of Optionetics would be the kind of transaction that might 
receive little or no visibility.  The general upfront price terms of the 
acquisition would be disclosed, but there may not be a disclosure of any 
contingent portion of the payment unless and until the contingency 
becomes payable.  Even in the event a contingency were to become 
payable, it would be accounted for through an adjustment to 
OptionsXpress’ goodwill and not obviously tied to the Optionetics 
 
 92. Andrews et al., supra note 85, at 130.  The prospect that an acquirer might be able to engage 
in strategic behavior post-closing to undermine the seller’s ability to meet earnout targets and thereby 
generate accounting profits is a real one.  See text accompanying notes 122–26, infra. 
 93. See supra Part II. 
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acquisition.  The accounting for the transaction lacked transparency. 
With SFAS 141(R), the accounting treatment of the transaction is 
more transparent, and it is easier to observe the performance of the 
earnout term.  For example, at the time of the acquisition, 
OptionsXpress valued the likelihood that it would be required to make 
payment on earnout at $14.5 million, or 41% of the nominal earnout 
amount.  During the course of the first eight quarters following the 
initial disclosure, OptionsXpress regularly updated its fair value 
measurements.  By the end of the first year, the fair value of the earnout 
had declined to $12.13 million.  As a result, one year after the merger, 
OptionsXpress recorded an increase in earnings on its income statement 
equal to the $2.04 million decrease in the fair value of the contingent 
payment obligation from the initial estimate of the fair value at the time 
of acquisition.  By the end of the second year, the fair value of the 
earnout declined to $4.81 million and OptionsXpress recorded an 
additional increase in earnings of $7.32 million.  Ultimately, no earnout 
payment was made.  One might infer from the decline in the fair values 
found in the disclosures that OptionsXpress learned information about 
the seller and its business during the course of the first year.  This new 
information reduced OptionsXpress’ estimate of the seller’s ability to 
achieve the earnout goals and thereby trigger a payment. 
Figure 1 
OptionsXpress fair value disclosures for acquisition of Optionetics 
 E.O. FV at Acq. FV at Q1 FV at Q2 FV at Q3 FV at Q4 
Optionetics $35.0 $14.5 $14.16 $11.9 $12.13 $12.04 
+/- - ($20.5) ($0.34) ($2.26) $0.23 ($0.09) 
 
 FV at Q5 FV at Q6 FV at Q7 FV at Q8 E.O. Pmt FV + Pmt 
Optionetics $8.75 $8.88 $4.81 $4.81 $ - $4.81 
+/- ($3.29) $0.13 ($4.06) $ - $ - ($9.69) 
 
By examining the fair value disclosures of a larger number of 
transactions, one can develop a near real-time assessment of the 
performance of contingent earnout provisions.  This assessment can 
provide insights into the adequacy of earnouts as contractual responses 
to information asymmetries.  If sellers are using earnouts as information 
signals, as new, positive information is learned during the post-closing 
period, one expects to see an increase in the fair value.  This increase 
would reflect a confirmation of the seller’s optimistic pre-signing 
statements.  On the other hand, if sellers are not using the earnout 
mechanism to signal information to acquirers, then the pattern of post-
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closing fair values should not reflect the separation pattern one expects 
with a credible signal. 
In assessing the role played by earnout provisions, ideally one would 
like to be able to directly observe a seller’s private information.  Of 
course, this is not possible.  However, the new disclosure rules provide a 
reasonable, if imperfect, approximation of the acquisition of private 
information during the post-closing period.  Changes in the fair value of 
earnouts over time permit observers to make some assessments about 
the extent of private information present in transactions, and the role of 
the earnout provision as a contractual response to adverse selection.  For 
example, if high quality sellers are using earnouts to signal to potential 
acquirers their unobservable value, then after closing, one would expect 
the acquirer to confirm the seller’s statements through the acquisition of 
private information during the earnout’s measuring period.  
Confirmation of the seller statements can be observed by outsiders 
through regular increases in the fair value of the contingent payment.  
On the other hand, if acquirers are unable to confirm pre-signing 
statements about the seller’s hidden information during the measuring 
period, then fair values should not generate an obvious separating 
equilibrium. 
Fair value data is a better proxy for assessing the role played by 
earnouts than simply payment data alone.94  Fair value data includes two 
kinds of information.  First, any payments made pursuant to the earnout 
provision are included in the fair value of the earnout.  This payment 
data is usually a backward-looking assessment of whether the seller 
achieved the targets under the earnout provision.  However, payment 
data alone can be misleading because the payment data by itself does not 
indicate whether the acquirer learned any previously hidden seller 
information prior to making the payment or even if the target achieved 
the stated earnout targets.95  The mere fact that a backward-looking 
payment has been made does not confirm one way or the other the 
hypothesis that earnouts are contractual responses to the problem of 
adverse selection. 
The second component of fair value data is a forward-looking 
estimate of the seller’s future performance.  Fair value estimates require 
a determination by the acquirer of the future likelihood that the seller 
might achieve earnout targets.  Accurate estimates about the future 
 
 94. Two previous studies have assembled some partial payment data from public filings.  See 
Kohers & Ang, supra note 1; Cain et al, supra note 1. 
 95. Where a large number of the earnout recipients remain with the acquirer as continuing 
employees of the seller, the acquirer may have an incentive for morale reasons and others to make 
earnout payments even if they have not been earned.  Where continuing employees have developed an 
expectation of receiving the earnout the cost to the acquirer of not making payment and discouraging 
continuing employees may be high relative to the cost of simply making a payment. 
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likelihood of an earnout payment becoming payable depend on 
information.  As the acquirer learns more information about the seller, 
including assimilating the seller’s private information during the post-
closing period, the acquirer is in a better position to revise and make a 
more accurate estimate of the seller’s likelihood to achieve the earnout 
targets.  When positive information is added to the acquirer’s total mix 
of information, the fair value estimate of the earnout payment should 
increase to reflect the addition of new, positive information.  When the 
acquirer learns new, negative information, the acquirer lowers the fair 
value estimate to reflect the new estimate of the true likelihood of the 
seller meeting the earnout targets.  As a result, changes to forward-
looking fair value data are a reasonable, if not perfect, proxy for post-
closing private information. 
A. The Sample 
In order to create the sample for this study, I conducted a search of 
the SDC Platinum M&A Database for acquisition transactions (mergers, 
asset sales, stock purchase agreements, and tender offers) involving 
public and private targets announced during the period from 2006 to 
2009.96  Because earlier work confirms that earnouts are more prevalent 
in transactions involving private firms, I did not include a lower dollar 
threshold on the transaction size for my search.  I also excluded any 
transactions where the seller was in bankruptcy proceedings.  This broad 
search generated an initial set of 22,000 transactions. 
I narrowed this pool further to include only those transactions that 
disclosed an earnout component as part of the overall consideration.  
This reduced the pool of transactions to 738 transactions.  The overall 
incidence of earnouts in my sample (3.35%) was consistent with those 
of previous studies of earnouts.97  I then discarded any transactions that 
were announced prior to implementation of SFAS 141(R) on January 1, 
2009.  The total number of transactions announced during the calendar 
year of 2009 with earnouts for which acquirers were required to make 
fair value disclosures was 140. 
Finally, I reduced the pool even more by eliminating transactions 
with foreign (47) or private (27) acquirers who were not required to 
make public filings.  I also eliminated from the pool those transactions 
with U.S. acquirers who, for whatever reason, did not comply with the 
disclosure requirements (10).  This produced a final pool of fifty-six 
 
 96. SDC Platinum Database (available through subscription with Thomson Reuters Financial 
Securities Data). 
 97. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 153; Datar et al., supra note 1, at 220; Ragozzino & Reuer, supra 
note 1, at 8. 
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transactions for which the acquirers made public disclosures of the fair 
value of contingent payments during each of the quarterly measuring 
periods following announcement of the transaction.  The fair value data 
for this sample was hand-collected from corporate 10-K and 10-Q 
filings. 
The composition of the resulting sample is largely consistent with 
samples in previous studies.  As with previous studies, the targets 
identified are predominantly private firms or divisions of public 
companies.  Eleven transactions (19.3%) involve divestitures of 
subsidiaries.  Only one target in the sample of fifty-six firms was a 
publicly traded firm.98  Statutory mergers are the predominant 
transaction form (54%) with asset purchases and stock purchase 
agreements (33% and 12%, respectively) also represented. 
Again, largely consistent with previous studies, 41% of transactions 
with an earnout involve cross-industry pairings where one might expect 
acquirers to be at an information disadvantage with respect to sellers.  
The use of earnouts is concentrated in a small number of sectors, as 
defined by their two-digit Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC).  Just 
five sectors (business services (SIC73), medical devices and instruments 
(SIC38), engineering and management services (SIC87), 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals (SIC28), as well as electronics and other 
equipment (SIC36)) account for more than 75% of all transactions in the 
sample with earnouts. 
 
 98. The single instance of a publicly traded firm using an earnout from the data set was Edwards 
Lifesciences Corp. 
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Figure 2 
Two Digit SIC (Top five) 
 
 Target Acquirer 
Business Services (73) 
16 17 
Engineering & Management Services (87) 
7 5 
Instruments & Related Products (38) 
8 6 
Chemicals & Allied Prod. (28) 
6 9 
Electronic & Other Equipt. (36) 
5 6 
 
On average, the earnout component of the merger consideration is 
significant, comprising approximately 34.6% of the total consideration 
available in the transaction.  In 20% of the transactions, the amount of 
consideration theoretically available to sellers as part of the earnout is 
larger than the initial consideration available in the transaction.  These 
outsized earnout amounts are concentrated in the pharmaceuticals sector 
(6 of 11).  There are a small number (5) of larger transactions (greater 
than $200 million in total transaction value) with earnouts.  Of those 
five transactions, four are in the pharmaceuticals sector with an earnout 
milestones tied to FDA approval of the target drug.  In the 
pharmaceuticals sector in particular, the average value of transactions 
with earnouts is $334 million with the size of the average earnout in that 
sector equal to $229 million (68.5% of the total consideration).  
Reliance on the earnout in the pharmaceutical sector is consistent with 
an understanding that the future value of the seller is tied to events that 
are not yet known or where there is still hidden information with respect 
to the viability of the seller’s product to achieve government approval.  
Outside of the pharmaceuticals sector, the magnitude of contingent 
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continuing employees, a significant number of them are also 
shareholders.  However, their status as continuing employees does not 
affect their ability to receive a payment pursuant to the terms of the 
earnout provision; therefore as compared to an employment contract 
with a performance bonus, the earnout is not an efficient mechanism for 
managing potential seller moral hazard.100 
B. Post-Closing Performance of Fair Value Disclosures 
Examining the fair value disclosures may help resolve whether sellers 
are relying on earnouts to signal private information to potential 
acquirers and thus whether earnouts act as a contractual response to the 
problem of adverse selection, or, if in the alternative, earnouts simply 
resolve the problem of pre-contractual uncertainty.  High quality sellers 
using the earnout to signal private information should exhibit a pattern 
of increases in fair value estimates as acquirers confirm the sellers’ 
information during the post-closing period.  Such a pattern would be 
evidence of a separating equilibrium and suggest that high quality sellers 
rely on earnouts to signal hidden information.  In the alternative, if 
acquirers and sellers are relying on earnouts for reasons other than to 
signal private information—for instance, to resolve symmetrical 
uncertainty—then one should not observe a separating equilibrium.  If 
uncertainty motivates the reliance on earnouts, then the post-closing 
performance of fair value disclosures should be similarly stochastic to 
reflect that motivation. 
A histogram of the fair value data shows the development of fair 
values over time.  In general, acquisition acquirers tended to be 
relatively optimistic about the likelihood of the seller to meet the stated 
earnout targets and thus trigger payments under the earnout provision.  
Nearly 40% of acquirers estimated that the target would be able to meet 
or exceed the stated value of the earnout.  By the end of the second year 
during the post-closing period, however, acquirers were decidedly more 
pessimistic, with 25% of acquirers essentially writing off the entire 
earnout payment.  To the extent one is concerned whether sellers rely on 
earnouts to signal private information about their unobservable quality, 
this large increase in write-offs following closing suggests that acquirers 
learn negative information in the post-closing period that does not 
confirm seller pre-contractual statements. 
 
 
 100. See infra notes 122–26. 
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declined from 79.3% to 43.5% over the same time period.  Had sellers 
been relying on the earnout to signal hidden information then one would 
expect the difference in means from the fair value at announcement and 
two years following announcement to be significant and positive.  
Instead, the t-statistic is significant (p value=0.006) and the mean 
estimate has declined over the two year measuring period.102 
Figure 3 
Fair Value Disclosures, All Transactions 
 
 Fair Value  
at Acquisition 
Fair Value + Payments 
at 1 Year 
Fair Value + Payments 




(p value 0.618) 
52.98%** 
(p value 0.006) 
**indicates significance at the 95% level. 
 
Although the difference in means is significant, one cannot claim that 
sellers are using the earnout to signal unobservable positive information 
about the seller.  Rather than suggest that the acquirer has learned new 
hidden information that reveals the seller not to be a lemon, the decline 
in fair values may be attributed to new negative information received by 
the acquirer over the course of two years following closing.  This result 
is inconsistent with an interpretation that buyers and sellers rely on 
earnouts to signal hidden information to potential acquirers.  On the 
other hand, it is consistent with an interpretation that buyers and sellers 
rely on earnouts to resolve symmetrical uncertainty.  Although earnouts 
may play a role in reducing uncertainty and distributing the risk of 
adverse outcomes, one cannot claim from the fair value data that 
earnouts play a role in signaling positive hidden information to acquirers 
prior to contracting. 
Previous studies posited that information asymmetries are more 
extreme where acquirers and sellers come from different industrial 
sectors.103  These studies concluded that adverse selection thus accounts 
for the increased likelihood of parties relying on earnout provisions in 
 
 102. Using a Wilcoxon signed rank test for small samples yields similar results: the z statistic for a 
two tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test is 2.95 (p value: 0.0032, Ns/r: 51). 
 103. See Datar et al., supra note 1; Ragazzino & Reuer, supra note 1. 
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such transactions.104  Where the acquirer is from a different SIC than the 
seller, the acquirer may have little or no basis to make a reasonable 
assessment of the seller’s value or its prospects prior to the acquisition.  
In 41.1% of transactions in the sample, the acquirer and the seller did 
not share the same two-digit SIC.  In these transactions, the average fair 
value of contingent payments at the announcement of the acquisition 
was 71.1% of the nominal earnout available.  By the end of four quarters 
of disclosures, the average fair value of contingent payments (net of any 
payments) fell to just 55.0% of the nominal earnout available.  At the 
end of eight quarters, the fair value of contingent payments for 
transactions across industrial groups declined to just 40.3% of the 
nominal earnout available. 
A two sided t-test for the difference in means for the fair value of 
earnout payments two years after announcement permits us to reject the 
null hypothesis that sellers from different industrial sectors as their 
acquirers rely on earnouts to signal hidden information.  Rather than 
exhibit an increase in the fair value of the earnout, acquirers from 
different industrial sectors discounted the fair values.  The t-statistic for 
the decline in the mean fair value two years after acquisition is 
significant and negative (p value 0.0004).  This result suggests that 
acquirers received negative information about the seller during the post-
closing period, and, to the extent acquirers were relying on earnouts to 
resolve adverse selection, they were unable to confirm any seller pre-
signing statements. 
On the other hand, where acquirers and sellers are from the same 
industrial code, the declines in the fair values of contingent payments 
are not as significant, although they do decline from 69.3% to 61.8% 
over the first two years.  The t-statistic for the mean fair value for 
transactions in which the acquirer and the seller shared the same SIC 
was not significant (p value 0.359).  This result suggests that acquirers 
received no information, either positive or negative, during the two 
years following announcement of the acquisition that would affect its 
initial valuation of the earnout contingency.  This result is consistent 
with an interpretation that parties rely on earnouts to resolve 
uncertainties rather than adverse selection. 
 
 104. See Datar et al., supra note 1; Ragazzino & Reuer, supra note 1. 
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Figure 4 
Fair Value Disclosures, SIC 
 
 Fair Value 
 at Acquisition 
Fair Value  
at 1 Year 
Fair Value  
at 2 Years 
All transactions 
70.1% 67.8% 52.98%** 
Acquirer Same SIC 
69.3% 76.7%  
(p value 0.161) 
61.8%  
(p value 0.359) 
Acquirer Difference 
SIC 
71.1% 55.0%**  
(p value 0.037) 
40.3%**  
(p value 0.0004) 
** indicates significance at the 95% level. 
 
Where buyers acquire sellers from different industrial sectors, one 
expects there to be more information asymmetries.  If the earnout played 
a role in helping resolve those asymmetries, one would expect to see 
acquirers confirm pre-signing seller statements during the post-closing 
period through an increase in the fair values of contingent payments.  
The observed decline in fair values is not consistent with an 
interpretation that parties rely on earnouts to overcome adverse 
selection.  Earnouts do not appear to generate the additional positive 
information during the post-closing period that one might expect if the 
earnout were intended to signal hidden information across industrial 
sectors.  The decline in observed fair values is consistent with the 
alternative theory that parties rely on earnouts to resolve uncertainty 
rather than signal information. 
Previous studies posited that there may be particular industries (i.e. 
high growth technology industries or services) where information 
asymmetries may be more extreme.  Those studies found that earnouts 
are more prevalent in industries where information asymmetries are 
thought to be more extreme.105  For example, earnouts are more 
prevalent in transactions involving sellers in business services, high 
technology, medical devices and the pharmaceutical industry.  In those 
industries, there is a plausible argument that sellers have hidden 
information that they might have difficulty credibly conveying to an 
 
 105. See Datar et al., supra note 1; Ragazzino & Reuer, supra note 1. 
34
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/3
2012] EARNOUTS IN CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 161 
acquirer.106  With the exception of earnouts in the pharmaceuticals 
sector (SIC 28), the estimated fair values of earnouts declined in 
transactions across all sectors.  T-tests on the fair value means of 
earnouts two years following announcement of the transaction permit us 
to reject the null hypothesis that sellers rely on earnouts to signal hidden 
information.  With respect to all sectors represented, except the 
pharmaceuticals sector, the fair value data suggests that acquirers did 
not learn private information in the post-closing period that confirmed 
pre-signing seller statements.  These results are consistent with an 
alternate hypothesis that earnouts play a role in reducing uncertainty and 
distributing the risk of adverse outcomes, but do not necessarily 
facilitate the credible transmission of hidden information between the 
parties prior to contracting. 
Figure 5: Fair Value Disclosures, by Two Digit SIC 
 
 At Acquisition At 1 Year At 2 Years 
All transactions 
70.1% 67.8% 52.98%** 
Target SIC 
   
73. Business Services 
66.8% 68.41%  
(p value 0.813) 
47.7%  
(p value 0.154) 
87. Engineering & Management 
Services 
94.8% 81.2%  
(p value 0.373) 
52.7%  
(p value 0.084) 
38. Instruments/Medical Devices 
76.4% 67.6%  
(p value 0.526) 
47.9%  
(p value 0.064) 
28. Pharmaceuticals/Chemicals 
51.3% 58.2%  
(p value 0.096) 
51.8%  
(p value 0.975) 
**indicates significance at the 95% level. 
 
Earlier studies have also posited that transactions involving the 
acquisition of divisions or product lines from sellers would also be 
 
 106. The rationale for business services having large numbers of earnouts is not likely related to 
adverse selection, but rather more closely related to moral hazard. 
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susceptible to severe information asymmetries.107  Because such sales 
involve businesses that do not stand alone and are often highly 
integrated into other associated businesses, it may be difficult for 
potential acquirers to disaggregate and identify sources of value in these 
targets.  As a result, sellers may have private information about the 
sellers’ prospects that are difficult to convey credibly to buyers.  The 
changes in the mean fair value of earnouts associated with division sales 
are not statistically different from zero (p value 0.904).  This is 
consistent with an interpretation that the acquirer has not learned any 
information during the post-closing period that would affect the 
acquirer’s estimate of the likelihood of the seller to meet the earnout 
objectives.  It is also consistent with the alternate hypothesis that 
earnouts reduce uncertainty and distribute risk, rather than convey 
hidden information from sellers to buyers prior to contracting. 
Figure 6: Fair Value Disclosures, Divestiture/Not Divestiture 
 
 At Acquisition At 1 Year At 2 Years 
All transactions 
70.1% 67.8% 52.98%** 
Divesture 
73.5% 72.7% 
(p value 0.955) 
68.6% 
(p value 0.904) 
Not Divesture 
69.2% 66.6% 
(p value 0.582) 
49.2%** 
(p value 0.008) 
**indicates significance at the 95% level. 
 
It is possible that sellers rely on particular earnout milestones to 
signal private information to acquirers.  For example, sellers may use 
technical or regulatory milestones to signal their relative confidence 
about unobservable attributes of the seller’s value.  During post-closing 
periods, as acquirers are able to confirm seller pre-signing statements 
with respect to technical capacity or regulatory progress, then the fair 
value of contingent payments should rise to reflect this new information.  
However, the observed fair value data (including any payments) tied to 
nonfinancial milestones does not suggest the acquirers learned positive, 
new information during the post-closing period.  The observed declines 
 
 107. See Datar et al., supra note 1; Ragazzino & Reuer, supra note 1. 
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suggest it is consistent with the alternate hypothesis that earnouts 
resolve post-closing uncertainty. 
Figure 7: Fair Value Disclosures, by Targets 
 
 At Acquisition At 1 Year At 2 Years 
Revenue Targets 
68.5% 59.2%  
(p value 0.201) 
50.5%**  
(p value 0.023) 
Performance Targets 
66.0% 75.0%  
(p value 0.282) 
61.7%  
(p value 0.441) 
Regulatory Targets 
70.2% 79.3%  
(p value 0.413) 
48.1%  
(p value 0.073) 
Technical Targets 
98.9% 98.2%  
(p value 0.500) 
39.9%  
(p value 0.298) 
**indicates significance at the 95% level 
 
As neither party has any inherent advantage in predicting the future of 
the economy, targets tied to revenue performance may be better 
understood as resolving the problem of symmetrical uncertainty rather 
than adverse selection.  When general economic conditions are weak, as 
was the case during the sample period, one expects that sellers may be 
unable to meet earnout targets.  Thus the data is consistent with an 
interpretation that earnouts do not generate valuable signals but rather 
permit parties to shift exogenous uncertainty to one party or the other.  
Thus, rather than address adverse selection, earnouts tied to revenue of 
the seller are probably better understood as resolving uncertainty. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS 
The conventional wisdom amongst the academy with respect to 
earnout provisions is that these provisions help guard acquirers against 
adverse selection in the context of an acquisition.  The alternate view, 
common amongst practitioners, is that earnouts are a device to manage 
uncertainty.  Although earlier studies found that earnouts are more likely 
to be employed by dealmakers in situations where one expects 
information asymmetries to be more severe, the data above suggest that 
sellers do not rely on earnouts to signal their unobservable quality to 
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acquirers. 
There are two important conclusions one can draw from the fair value 
accounting data.  First, to the extent sellers might intend to rely on 
earnouts to respond to the problem of adverse selection in pre-signing 
negotiations, earnouts appear to do a poor job of sorting high quality 
sellers from low quality sellers.  During the post-closing period, 
acquirers do not systematically report receiving private information to 
confirm the pre-signing optimism of sellers.  Because acquirers are not 
able to confirm pre-signing seller statements systematically, we do not 
observe a separating equilibrium.  Without a separation between high 
and low quality sellers, earnouts cannot function as a credible 
information signal in response to adverse selection.108  Consequently, 
the post-closing disclosure data does not support the adverse selection 
hypothesis. 
Second, although earnouts may fail to serve a useful signaling 
function, this does not necessarily mean they are not valuable in the 
contracting process.  Sellers may be relying on earnouts for reasons 
other than sending signals about their private information.  Rather than 
resolve adverse selection, parties may be relying on earnouts to resolve 
problems of uncertainty that present themselves during the process of 
pricing an acquisition consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis.  
Resolving symmetrical uncertainty, or “bridging the valuation gap,” 
during the pre-contractual phase can assist parties in overcoming an 
important contracting challenge.109  To the extent contingent payment 
provisions do not elicit new information but simply allocate adverse 
costs of uncertain events to the seller, they undertake an important 
distributive function that permits parties to move forward and create 
joint value.110  By creating uniform expectations with respect to any one 
of a number of uncertainties, the earnout mechanism permits parties to 
normalize their joint expectations about the future and thus agree on a 
pricing formula for the seller where, in the absence of uniform joint 
expectations, parties might not be able to reach agreement.111 
 
 108. In order for a signal to be valuable, sellers must all uniformly use the signal in the same 
manner.  If sellers are not uniformly using the earnout mechanism to convey private information to 
potential acquirers, the earnout is unable to generate a separating equilibrium and loses its potential 
value as a credible information signal due to acquirer confusion.  See infra notes 14–18. 
 109. Memorandum from Arthur Wright, Jennifer Avery, and Melissa Deal on Analysis and 
Guidance for Use of Earnouts, Judicial Interpretations Working Grp. of the ABA M&A Committee 
(Aug. 3, 2010) (on file with author). 
 110. Resolving distributive challenges to transactions is important.  Distributive challenges can 
often result in parties not pursuing what are otherwise socially valuable transactions.  ROBERT H. 
MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 17–23 
(2000) (discussing how distributive challenges can prevent otherwise socially valuable transactions from 
going forward). 
 111. See Gilson, supra note 16. 
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Although essentially distributive in nature, a contingent payment that 
resolves pre-contractual uncertainty permits parties to engage in a value 
enhancing transaction.  The earnout distributes the consequences of 
adverse outcomes to the party with the higher tolerance for it and in that 
way helps facilitate pricing and accomplishment of the transaction.  
Because sellers may have a higher tolerance for risk during the sale 
process, due perhaps to an optimism bias, they may be more willing to 
defer some portion of their compensation and accept the risk of adverse 
outcomes in order to accomplish the transaction.112  Buyers are 
protected from potentially overpaying in the event the future state of the 
world is not as rosy as portrayed by the sellers, and sellers receive some 
upside in the event that they are.  By resolving uncertainty in the pre-
contractual phase in favor of the acquirer, earnouts can help both parties 
reach an efficient price without necessarily eliciting any private 
information about the seller.113 
A key implication of these results is a suggestion for modesty in 
claims made of those of us who study transactional law.114  The essence 
of the nascent study of transactional law is that economic incentives 
drive the contracting process, including the structure of the transaction 
and the content of the contracts.115  By understanding these incentives 
 
 112. Bruner notes that earnouts might also have an option value for sellers.  See BRUNER, supra 
note 1, at 615–16.  It may be that some sellers treat an earnout like an option.  In the option model, a low 
quality seller may accept an out-of-the-money earnout option because it is valuable to the seller given 
the seller’s risk tolerance, even if the probability of the earnout becoming payable is small.  For a risk-
loving seller there may little downside to accepting an earnout and there is potentially a large upside.  
My colleague, Renee Jones, calls this the “lottery effect” of the earnout. 
 113. See Gilson, supra note 16. 
 114. Interest by legal academics in transactional law has been growing in recent years as 
demonstrated by the growth of “Deals” courses as well as the establishment of a provisional 
transactional lawyering section by the AALS.  For instance, I teach a “Deals” course at the Boston 
College Law School that is based on similar courses offered at Columbia Law School, Stanford Law 
School, as well as at a growing list of law school across the United States.  In 2010, Drexel Law School 
sponsored the first ever transactional lawyering moot court as part of more general effort to formalize 
transactional lawyering skills development.  In 2011, the AALS started a new section on Transactional 
Lawyering and Skills as part of the broader move to recognize and develop a normative approach to the 
teaching of transactional lawyering. 
 115. An approach to the study of transactional lawyering heavily influenced by the field of 
transaction cost economics has been taken up by many, including myself, in the years since Professor 
Gilson’s article was first published.  See, e.g., Framing Contract, supra note 3 (describing the “Deals” 
project); Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010) (proposing a theory of 
regulatory arbitrage based largely in transaction cost economics); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & 
Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction Of Formal and Informal Contracting In Theory, Practice, 
and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010) (considering the effects of combining formal and 
informal contracting on transaction structures); Brian JM Quinn, Asset Specificity and Transaction 
Structures: A Case Study of @Home Corporation, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 77 (2010) (analyzing the 
information problems that influenced the structuring of the @Home Corp.); Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon 
Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239 (1995) (applying Gilson’s 
transactional lawyering approach to the work of lawyers in the venture capital industry); Albert Choi & 
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and transaction costs, economics lawyers can improve the ability of 
lawyers to design contractual provisions and transaction structures that 
will create value for clients.116  In part, it is this perspective that 
motivates the adverse selection hypothesis for earnouts. 
However, the results from the fair value data with respect to the 
reported performance of earnouts suggest that we should approach the 
transactional lawyering project with some degree of modesty.  Although 
earnouts may be prevalent in circumstances where one might expect 
adverse selection to be a potential problem, there is little evidence to 
suggest that earnouts actually function to sort high quality sellers from 
low quality sellers.  Rather, contingent payment provisions are more 
likely to resolve questions of uncertainty.  Though the resolution of 
uncertainty can be critical to ensuring parties are able to price 
transactions efficiently, where unknown future states of the world may 
make it impossible for parties to otherwise accomplish a transaction, it 
may appear less analytically ambitious than the prospect of contingent 
payments resolving information problems that might present challenges 
to transactions.  While this result does not suggest that an approach to 
the study of transactions based on transaction cost economics is 
unworthy, it does suggest there may be real limits to relying exclusively 
on this approach when thinking about contracting.117 
Of course, there is power in using the transaction cost model to 
analyze complex transactions, but the model has its limits.  Economic 
models are not intended to be precisely predictive of real-world 
behavior.  Their power comes from the ability of models to help us 
break down complex, real-world transactions into their essential 
components.  This is not always a simple task and there is ample room 
 
George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 
YALE L. J. 848 (2010) (analyzing the effects of information problems on contract design); D. Gordon 
Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing that lawyers 
add value by doing much more than simply minimizing transaction costs). 
 116. For a detailed discussion of the motivation behind the various “Deals” courses and how 
transactional lawyering can generate value for clients, see Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing Corporate 
Transactions into the Law School Classroom, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 475 (2002).  For a discussion 
of a normative approach to corporate lawyering and the education of deal lawyers, see Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 486 (2007); 
Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15 (1995); Tina L. Stark, 
Thinking Like a Deal Lawyer, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 223 (2004); George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as 
Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW. 279 (2009).  The development of “Deals” courses over the past 
decade dovetails with recent recognition that law schools have an obligation to train “client-ready” 
lawyers and the fact that firms, and more importantly their clients, are less willing to pay for the years of 
apprenticeship-like training that gave earlier generations of legal professionals to space to develop deal-
making instincts.  See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007). 
 117. Of course, the challenge of translating economic models to real life is not solely a problem of 
transactional lawyering. 
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for specification error.118  In this case, the new disclosure data suggests 
a specification error in the analysis of the role of earnouts in merger 
agreements.  Rather than resolve adverse selection, the disclosure data 
suggests we specify the role of contingent payments as one of resolving 
uncertainty, and not one of a credible signal for private information.  To 
the extent earnouts respond to uncertainty, the ex ante distribution of 
outcomes with respect to the fair values is indeterminate.  The presence 
of the earnout itself generates no particular information for a third party.  
When specified in that way, the fact that the fair value of earnouts 
declines over time and that earnouts are not paid out does not 
necessarily raise any concern about the efficacy of earnout provisions.  
These results are merely stochastic ex post results that reflect the 
uncertainty of contracting.  The earnout may be better understood as a 
risk allocation tool.  The difference is subtle, but significant, during the 
contracting phase. 
VII. REMAINING QUESTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS 
Although the fair value data is generally at odds with the view that 
contingent payments are a contractual response to adverse selection, 
there may be alternative ways to explain the disclosure data that do not 
wholly discount the adverse selection hypothesis.  First, it is possible 
that the reason for the relatively poor performance of contingent 
earnouts relative to acquirer expectations is related to some exogenous 
variable, such as overall economic performance.  According to this 
explanation, parties rely on earnouts to signal private information about 
their underlying quality, but poor economic conditions generally have 
made it impossible for sellers to meet the earnout targets.  Of course, it 
is true that general economic conditions following the financial crisis of 
2008 may have negatively impacted both seller and acquirer 
performance.  Therefore, the fact that sellers are unable to achieve the 
thresholds required to trigger contingent payments might be wholly 
unremarkable.  However, the transactions included in this sample were 
all announced following the onset of the 2008 financial crisis and 
subsequent recession.  Consequently, the initial estimates of earnout 
values disclosed by acquirers in this sample were made at a time when 
acquirers had an opportunity to incorporate the effects of the poor 
economic environment into their expectations for the target’s 
performance.  Indeed, in early 2009 when the first of the sample’s 
transactions were announced, the economic crisis and economic future 
 
 118. See, e.g., Cain et al., supra note 1 (conflating the concepts of “uncertainty” and “adverse 
selection). 
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appeared most dire.  It was in that environment that many of the initial 
estimates of seller performance were made.  One expects that acquirers 
would have already incorporated that poor economic outlook into their 
estimates of seller performance at the time the transactions were 
announced. 
In any event, if it were the case that general economic conditions 
were the cause of sellers’ inability to meet earnout milestones, and if 
earnouts were nevertheless relied upon by parties to signal private 
information, then one would still expect to see a separating equilibrium 
with respect to the performance of earnouts with nonfinancial targets.  If 
parties are using nonfinancial targets to signal private information, the 
fair values of those earnouts should be unrelated to exogenous economic 
conditions.  However, one does not observe a significant increase in 
performance in earnouts with nonfinancial targets.  If sellers were 
relying on earnouts to signal private nonfinancial information during 
poor economic times, we still would expect to see a separating 
equilibrium confirming private information.  We do not observe that 
result, however.  Thus, it is more likely that earnouts are intended to 
protect to acquirers precisely from the kind of unexpected negative 
economic performance that we have experienced in recent years 
(symmetrical uncertainty) and not to signal private information. 
Second, it is still early with respect to disclosure data.  This study is 
the first of its kind to be conducted following implementation of SFAS 
141(R).  It is possible that firms may not yet be adequately or even 
accurately complying with the disclosure requirements.  For example, in 
the original sample of 140 transactions, a number of observations (9) 
were dropped because the acquirers failed for some reason to comply 
with their disclosure obligations under SFAS 141(R).  As firms gain 
more experience over time with fair value estimates of contingent 
payment obligations, they may become more adept at generating 
accurate estimates, which may influence future interpretations of the 
data, including the possible observation of a separation equilibrium 
related to earnouts.  Of course, firms have had at least five years of 
experience with fair value accounting in other contexts so the extent of 
additional learning may be limited.  For example, fair value accounting 
for Level 3 Assets already requires firms to make similar quarterly 
assessments with respect to the impairments to goodwill following 
acquisitions.119  Firms were able to implement those standards 
successfully before the implementation of contingent consideration 
accounting. 
 
 119. See FIN. ACCOUNTING FOUND., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 
157 (2010), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas157.pdf. 
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Third, it may be possible that the inability to observe a separating 
equilibrium is simply the result of overly conservative accounting 
practices by acquirers.  Accounting determinations are necessarily 
judgment calls by managers based upon information in hand at the time 
of the estimate.  Managers of acquirers may have internal motivations, 
not related to the seller’s performance, to discount the likelihood of an 
earnout obligation becoming due.  In this critique, buyers may 
overestimate the true fair value of the contingent payment at 
acquisition—essentially taking an earnings bath at the time of the 
acquisition.  Then, as time goes on, the acquirer adjusts the fair value of 
the earnout obligation to more realistic levels.  Because this overly 
conservative approach almost always means that buyers over-estimate 
the likelihood of making payments, it suggests that fair values of 
contingent payments will always decline over time.  It also suggests that 
buyers use contingent payments to store “cookie jar reserves,” adjusting 
fair values as required in order to generate accounting profits.120  This 
critique has some merit.  However, if it is true that fair value disclosures 
are not a fair and accurate representation of an earnout’s expected value, 
but simply a function of the acquirer’s requirement for cookie jar 
reserves, then fair value accounting rules fail to provide the transparency 
originally intended by rulemakers.  If these rules do not provide 
additional transparency into the real risks facing businesses, then it 
raises larger questions across a variety of areas beyond contingent 
payments where investors rely on fair value standards for their 
investment decision making and raises doubts more generally about the 
efficacy of the FASB’s fair value accounting project.121 
Finally, it is possible that although sellers attempt to use earnouts to 
signal hidden information, these attempts are not reflected in the fair 
value data because of confounding information asymmetries affecting 
the acquirer.  In particular, acquirers face a well-known moral hazard 
during the post-closing period that may overwhelm the signaling effect 
of an earnout.122  This moral hazard may lead to disagreements between 
the parties over the proper fair value of the earnout and the ability of 
sellers to achieve the earnout.  Anecdotal accounts suggest that earnouts 
generate many disputes or litigation among the parties.  For example, in 
the 2009 Delaware Chancery Court case, Aveta, Inc. v. Bengoa, Vice 
 
 120. CHARLES W. MULFORD & EUGENE E. COMISKEY, THE FINANCIAL NUMBERS GAME: 
DETECTING CREATIVE ACCOUNTING PRACTICES 51 (2002) (defining “cookie jar” reserves as an overly 
aggressive accrual of operating expenses and the creation of liability accounts done in an effort to 
reduce future-year operating expenses). 
 121. In this Article, I do not intend to call into question the efficacy of the fair value accounting 
project.  I merely take it at face value. 
 122. See Victor P. Goldberg, In Search of Best Efforts: Reinterpreting Bloor v. Falstaff, 44 ST. 
LOUIS U. L. J. 1465, 1476 (2000). 
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Chancellor Travis Laster noted that “[e]arn outs frequently give rise to 
disputes.”123  In another recent case in the Chancery Court, Airborne 
Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, the same jurist observed: 
[A]n earnout . . . typically reflects [a] disagreement over the value of the 
business that is bridged when the seller trades the certainty of less cash at 
closing for the prospect of more cash over time . . . But since value is 
frequently debatable and the causes of underperformance equally so, an 
earnout often converts today’s disagreement over price into tomorrow’s 
litigation over the outcome.124 
Searches of public records uncover few complaints related to 
contingent payments.  This paucity of lawsuits is not necessarily 
evidence that the conventional wisdom with respect to the propensity of 
earnouts to generate disputes is incorrect.125  Indeed, the cases found in 
the opinion and docket searches suggest why there is little evidence in 
the public record of earnout disputes.  Earnout provisions, like the one 
negotiated in the TRS Institute v. Transcend Services, tend to require 
that disputes be brought to private arbitration rather than through the 
courts.126  Consequently, it is likely that the public records drastically 
undercount the true rate of disputes related to the implementation of 
earnout provisions.  Where the nature of the disputes is made public, 
disputes between parties are consistent with the notion that once having 
completed an acquisition, the acquirer faces a moral hazard with respect 
to the degree of effort it places behind helping the seller achieve targets 
 
 123. 986 A.2d 1166, 1173 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 124. 984 A.2d 126, 132 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 125. I conducted two searches in an attempt to uncover the underlying rate of disputes with 
respect to contingent earnout provisions.  First, I conducted a search of both the Westlaw and 
Bloomberg Law databases for court opinions in the Federal courts and Delaware courts related disputes 
over earnouts, milestone payments, or other contingent payments.  This search revealed very few 
opinions.  Over the period 2009–2010, Delaware generated only three court opinions.  The Federal 
courts, for their part, generated just eighteen earnout-related opinions over the same period.  To the 
extent courts issued written opinions, five of the twenty-one earnout-related opinions involved attempts 
by plaintiffs to avoid contractually-mandated arbitration to resolve disputes over earnout payments.  In 
those cases, the courts uniformly denied them access to the court and ordered the parties back to 
arbitration.  The balance of the cases related to claims by sellers that acquirers were unfairly 
withholding earnout payments due to them.  In those claims, former shareholders of the seller generally 
make allegations that the acquirer took actions to frustrate the ability of the seller to achieve the earnout 
targets (i.e. acquirer moral hazard).  A similar review of the SEC filings and Delaware and Federal court 
dockets with respect to transactions in the study sample during the study period turns up only one 
disclosure of earnout-related litigation with similar allegations against the acquirer.  Complaint, TRS 
Inst., LLC v. Transcend Servs., No. 10-362 (M.D.N.C. May 6, 2010). 
 126. TRS Inst., LLC v. Transcend Servs., No. 10-362 (M.D.N.C. May 6, 2010).  Coates finds that 
private arbitration provisions are common in transactions involving private company sellers and price-
adjustment clauses.  John C. Coates IV, Managing Disputes Through Contract: Evidence from M&A 
(Feb. 27, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1915135.  Goldberg 
notes that his personal experience suggests that earnout related disputes are under-represented in the 
formal legal system.  See Goldberg supra note 122. 
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pursuant to the earnout provision.127 
To the extent acquirer moral hazard is a problem, this could lead to 
what appears to outside observers to be a pooling equilibrium.  Sellers 
may nevertheless attempt to signal their high quality, but such signaling 
is systematically undermined during the post-closing period by acquirers 
with incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior with respect to the 
seller.  Although the signal is overwhelmed by the confounding effect of 
acquirer moral hazard and thus unobservable to outside observers, it still 
may be possible that acquirers interpret the seller’s offering to accept an 
earnout as a costly ex ante signal.  If, however, the confounding effects 
of acquirer moral hazard are sufficiently large, one might also expect to 
observe sellers avoiding the earnout mechanism altogether.  The fact 
that sellers nevertheless agree to earnout provisions suggests that either 
that acquirer moral hazard is not a significant concern or that 
uncertainty, rather than information asymmetries, are more central to 
seller motivations in accepting earnout provisions. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This study calls into question the conventional academic wisdom with 
respect to the role played by earnouts in corporate acquisitions.  
Previous empirical works claim that earnouts are prevalent in 
circumstances where information asymmetries are severe.  In such 
situations, earnouts are thought to play a role in signaling hidden 
information to potential acquirers.  However, recently available fair 
value accounting data suggests that earnouts do not permit high quality 
sellers to sort themselves out from low quality sellers.  If sellers are not 
able to rely on earnouts to signal private information about their hidden 
value to prospective buyers, then earnouts lose one of the most 
important functions attributed to them by earlier studies and are thus not 
 
 127. According to the complaint in TRS Institute v. Transcend Services, immediately upon closing 
the transaction, the acquirer was alleged to have engaged in strategic behavior intended to reduce the 
likelihood that the acquirer would be required to make payment on the earnout.  The Complaint states: 
Based on the performance of TRS and their conversations with Transcend’s 
management, TRS executives believed TRS revenues would exceed the milestones 
necessary to generate the maximum Earn-Out of $3,000,000.  Beginning almost 
immediately after closing, however, Transcend engaged in a series of actions deliberately 
designed to minimize the amount of the Earn-Out while maximizing Transcend’s 
revenues.  These actions—including the allocation of resources away from TRS 
customer accounts, delays in implementation of new TRS accounts, and discouraging the 
development of TRS’s relationship with its most valuable customer and referral source—
breached the express terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement between TRS and 
Transcend and violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in all 
contracts. 
Complaint, TRS Inst., LLC v. Transcend Servs., No. 10-362 (M.D.N.C. May 6, 2010). 
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as useful as expected in overcoming the problem of adverse selection.  
Instead of signaling, earnouts appear to resolve the question of pre-
contractual uncertainty.  In resolving uncertainty rather than adverse 
selection, earnouts may facilitate the parties in reaching agreement on 
pricing without necessarily engaging in any information signaling.  
These results should urge modesty on scholars of transactional law who 
posit that buyers and sellers rely on earnouts to resolve problems of 
asymmetric information in the deal setting. 
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